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FIGHTING FOR TRUTH, JUSTICE, AND THE
ASYMMETRICAL WAY
BARBARA FLAGG*
KATHERINE GOLDWASSER7*
"What's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander."
For many, symmetry in law enjoys nearly the same status as mom,
baseball, and apple pie: it is of the essence of the American way of life. Law
would not be law as we know it without the requirement of evenhandedness;
justice as we envision her is blindfolded, so as not to see who stands before
her. Nevertheless, in the course of our careers (such as they are) in legal
academia, the two of us have from time to time proposed the adoption of
asymmetrical legal doctrines. We are quite certain that asymmetry is not only
tolerable in certain circumstances, but a necessity. Thus we're swimming
against the cultural tide, and so have encountered more than a little resistance
to our doctrinal proposals. We'd like to take this occasion to explore that
resistance and to reflect on its possible sources. In the event that the reader is
unfamiliar with the doctrinal recommendations of which we speak, we begin
with synopses of them.
One of us-Barbara-has discussed the issue of symmetry in the course
of criticizing existing race discrimination doctrine. One cornerstone of
constitutional race discrimination law is the Supreme Court's ruling that
there is a constitutional requirement of discriminatory intent: a facially race-
neutral practice with racially disparate effects will not be deemed even
presumptively inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause unless it can be
shown to have been adopted with discriminatory intent.' Barbara has
proposed a revised doctrine that would impose a heightened burden of
justification upon the government whenever a challenged facially neutral
criterion of decision has racially disparate effects that disadvantage people of
color; it emphasizes the concern that ostensibly race-neutral criteria of
decision formulated and/or deployed by white decisionmakers are in fact
white-specific.2 The proposal is asymmetrical: it would not call for similarly
* Professor of Law, Washington University. A.B., University of California-Riverside, 1967;
M.A., University of California-Riverside, 1971; J.D., University of California-Berkeley, 1987.
** Professor of Law, Washington University. B.A., University of Illinois, 1971; J.D., Temple
University, 1978.
I. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,240 (1976).
2. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind. But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
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heightened scrutiny in the case of a facially neutral practice that
disadvantages whites. The reason for the asymmetry can be found in the
phenomenon that gives rise to the proposal: the fact that whiteness generally
is transparent to whites.3 The transparency of criteria of decision employed
by white people impels further examination, which in constitutional doctrine
takes the form of "heightened scrutiny." Because only whites have the social
power that renders our point of view seemingly perspectiveless, there is no
need for similar close examination of race-neutral criteria of decision that
operate to the advantage of nonwhites (assuming there are instances of such).
Barbara also has proposed asymmetrical revisions of Title VII, which
prohibits race discrimination in employment Unlike the parallel
constitutional doctrine, Title VII does recognize violations based on proof of
racially disparate effects alone, without proof of discriminatory intent.
Barbara has described two possible methods of establishing the existence of
disparate effects that do not exhibit the weaknesses of current doctrine; each
would be available only to persons of color.4 The basis for asymmetry here is
found in the statute itself Title VII, Barbara argues, is best interpreted as
calling for equal opportunity in employment (as opposed to strictly
symmetrical treatment, or to a norm based on distributive effects).5
Moreover, "equal opportunity" cannot be interpreted in an assimilationist
manner. If "opportunity" is to be truly "equal," it must take into account
social and cultural variationg among employees. Thus Title VII's mandate
must be read as one of cultural pluralism. 6 Implementing that mandate calls
for asymmetrical rules because a policy of pluralism requires employment
decisions to be made in ways that are sensitive to varying cultural norms and
values.
The other one of us-Kathy-has proposed asymmetrical solutions to
problems arising in the context of the criminal process. In one such proposal
she argued that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Batson v.
Kentucky,7 which restricted prosecutors' use of peremptory challenges,
should not be extended to criminal defendants.8 Batson held (rightly, albeit
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953 (1993).
3. The transparency phenomenon is described more fully id. at 969-79.
4. See Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective
Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009,2038-51 (1995).
5. See id. at 2030-33.
6. Seeid. at 2033-37.
7. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
8. See Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges:
On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV. 808 (1989).
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belatedly, in Kathy's view9) that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors
from a petit jury because of their race. l0 Kathy advanced three arguments
against extending this prohibition to defendants. First, she contended,
criminal defendants are not state actors, and so are not subject to the
constraints of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.' Second, she
explained, fairness does not require symmetry in the criminal process.
1 2
Indeed, constitutional provisions designed to protect criminal defendants
point in the opposite direction: fairness in criminal trials mandates
asymmetry in an attempt to redress the enormous advantage enjoyed by the
state. Third, she argued, unlike with prosecution peremptory challenges,
there are sound reasons for preserving for criminal defendants the protections
afforded by unrestricted peremptories when they select the juries that will
decide their fate.
13
More recently, Kathy has written about the application, in the criminal
trial context, of evidence rules that call for the exclusion of evidence for
reasons of supposed unreliability, again advocating an asymmetrical
approach.14 She contends that these rules should not be applied to exclude
evidence offered by criminal defendants. Here too the Constitution provides
the guiding principles: the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 15
and the right to trial by juIy' 6 both support the conclusion that defendants
ought to be permitted to introduce exculpatory evidence even if it falls within
the scope of ostensibly unreliability-based exclusionary rules. With respect to
the former, to exclude possibly true (albeit unreliable) evidence of innocence
in order to reduce the risk of an erroneous acquittal-which, Kathy argues, is
precisely what unreliability-based rules of exclusion serve to do in this
context-is flatly at odds with the reasonable doubt requirement's
"fundamental value determination ... that it is far worse to convict an
9. See id. at 840.
10. Actually, the Batson Court framed the prohibition somewhat more narrowly (specifically, as
applying only to the use of peremptories by a prosecutor "to remove from the venire members of the
defendant's race," Batson, 476 U.S. at 96); however, the Court subsequently made clear that it applies
to all race-based prosecution challenges. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
11. Goldwasser, supra note 8, at 811-20.
12. See id. at 821-26.
13. See id. at 826-38.
14. See Katherine Goldwasser, Vindicating the Right to Trial by Jury and the Requirement of
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom about Excluding Defense
Evidence, __ GEO. L.J. _ (1998) (publication forthcoming).
15. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ('[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.").
16. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
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innocent [person] than to let a guilty [one] go free."'17 And as to the latter, if
the defendant in a criminal trial has opted for a jury, to prevent the jury from
making its own reliability/unreliability assessments of the defendant's
evidence on an item-by-item basis deprives the defendant of the protection
that the right to trial by jury is intended to provide.
Compelling as we find our proposals to be, they have not yet wrought
significant changes in the law. Indeed, we are 0-for-i: the only one of these
proposals to be considered by the United States Supreme Court-namely,
Kathy's argument against extending Batson's Equal Protection-based
limitations to criminal defendants-has been soundly rejected.'
Nevertheless, we remain convinced that asymmetry in law is at times-and
certainly in the contexts we have examined-the only route to justice. Why
does it meet with such resistance?
Some objections to asymmetrical legal doctrines focus on the notion of
fairness. These arguments equate evenhandedness and fairness; only rules
that treat everyone the same qualify as "fair." From this perspective,
asymmetrical rules are unfair because they grant relative benefits or burdens;
they treat some differently from others. 19 Thus Barbara's proposals are
"unfair" insofar as they grant legal remedies to nonwhites that are not
available to whites, and Kathy's are "unfair" in that they offer criminal
defendants potential litigation strategies that are not available to the
prosecution.
Our initial response to this line of argument is that fairness requires
similar treatment only when the persons in question are similarly situated;
when they are not, fairness often mandates different treatment. In this
society, people of color are never in exactly the same position as whites, and
criminal defendants are never in the same position as the prosecution. Thus
asymmetrical treatment is at least potentially "fair" in these settings; there
can be no plausible contention that different treatment is per se unfair in these
instances.
However, we do not imagine that most proponents of "fairness" see it as
universally interchangeable with evenhandedness. That is, we think that
few-if any-of them would reject the point we have just made, or deny the
existence of at least a limited number of instances in which fairness requires
17. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
18. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
19. This line of argument is to be distinguished from strategic objections to "different treatment."
See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN
LAW 19-48 (1990).
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different treatment. Thus the fairness objection is probably best understood in
light of the legal context in which it is made. It is the proposition that the rule
of law carries a special demand for evenhandedness; that a "law" that
"knows the person" is not law at all, or at least not law deserving of respect.
Even given this limited interpretation, the "fairness" objection still falls
short. First, our proposals are not the only examples of asymmetry in law.
Kathy's rest on and reflect an underlying asymmetry in constitutional
guarantees, which provide protection to the criminal defendant but not to the
prosecution. Her suggestions-asymmetrical approaches to some rules of
evidence and to the use of peremptory challenges in criminal trials-are no
more "unfair" than the Constitution itself. Barbara's proposals also build
upon a deeper, though perhaps less apparent, asymmetry in the law. Both the
Equal Protection Clause and Title VII were intended to operate for the
benefit of people of color, not whites. 20 At a minimum, each embodied the
remedial purpose of redressing the effects of past discrimination, 21 a purpose
that is not symmetrical. Thus Barbara's asymmetrical proposals also reflect a
preexisting asymmetry in the law.
Second, the demand that law be symmetrical cannot be understood as a
demand that no one ever be treated differently from another, because the law
necessarily makes distinctions between persons. Someone who exceeds the
speed limit ought to be cited, but another who drives within the posted speed
limit ought not to be. It seems that it's not the fact of different treatment, but
the particular different treatment, that gives rise to the "fairness" complaint.
That is, the contention that our proposals are unfair, even though couched in
terms of symmetry, must ultimately rest on some difficulty critics have with
the particular distinctions we draw.
Thus though evenhandedness is a value of genuine importance, it does not
fully account for the resistance with which our proposals often have been
met. There are four considerations that we think shed additional light on this
phenomenon of resistance. One is that symmetry in law tends to reinforce the
societal status quo. Preexisting inequalities in power and resources can only
be reproduced, not redressed, in a legal arena that treats all participants
identically. For example, many of the Bill of Rights guarantees are designed
to limit the power of government on the premise that the individual-the
"little guy"--stands in need of some protection against the potential excesses
of an unrestrained "big guy" state. Without some such limitations, in a world
in which the government and the individual were treated identically under the
20. Both also prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. Title VII does so explicitly, see 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988); the Equal Protection Clause by virtue of judicial interpretation. See
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
21. See Flagg, supra note 2, at 1006-07; Flagg, supra note 4, at 2030-37.
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law, the individual would stand little chance in any legal clash with the state.
The same argument applies to power imbalances between individuals. For
example, we now recognize that "freedom of contract" doctrines that
prevented the state from intervening on behalf of workers operated in
practice to entrench employers' power over them.22 Insisting upon a
symmetrical playing field would serve only to assure that employers would
reap the benefits of their superior bargaining position. An analogous, though
less direct, argument can be made with respect to race. People of color lack
the social privilege that attaches to whiteness. A legal system that is perfectly
symmetrical with respect to race leaves those relative advantages and
disadvantages untouched; it does nothing to counteract the effects of a racist
social structure.
A second consideration that may shed light on resistance to asymmetrical
legal proposals is that symmetry in fact serves to legitimate the existing
distribution of power and resources. Given a legal regime that does
contemplate intervention in the interest of justice, areas of law in which
symmetry is the rule send the message that in those instances there is no
maldistribution or imbalance needing to be redressed. Any seeming
inequality in those areas is thus presented as the product of benign social
forces-or as illusory.
Third, calls for symmetry themselves tend to appear asymmetrically. That
is, they arise with greater frequency and greater force when the asymmetry at
issue operates to the benefit of the less privileged than they do when
asymmetry benefits the already-advantaged. Legal doctrines that
asymmetrically benefit the latter seem not to evoke the same degree of
discomfort as do those that threaten an erosion of advantage. For a good
example of this, consider first the following response to a (less privileged)
defendant's contention that he should have a means of securing grants of
immunity for his witnesses because the prosecution could do so:
Th[is] contention, based on equalizing the powers of the prosecution
and the defense, is entirely unpersuasive. A criminal prosecution,
unlike a civil trial, is in no sense a symmetrical proceeding. ...
Viewed in isolation, there is a surface appeal to the equal availability
of use immunity for prosecution and defense witnesses. But in the
context of criminal investigation and criminal trials, where accuser
and accused have inherently different roles, with entirely different
powers and rights, equalization is not a sound principle on which to
22. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 880 (1987).
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extend any particular procedural device.23
Now compare with this asymmetry-is-fine argument Chief Justice
Burger's different view in his Batson dissent, expressed in the course of
denouncing the new peremptory challenge limitation imposed on the (more
privileged) prosecution:
Once the Court has held that prosecutors are limited in their use of
peremptory challenges, could we rationally hold that defendants are
not? "Our criminal justice system requires not only freedom from any
bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his
prosecution. Between him and the state the scales are to be evenly
held."24
Finally, advantage generally is not experienced as advantage, but as
neutrality. Whites do not see ourselves as occupying a privileged position
vis-d-vis people of color; men do not experience themselves as advantaged
vis-A-vis women. This feature of privilege renders symmetry its logical
expression: because advantage is experienced as if one were playing on a
level field, evenhandedness appears the appropriate mechanism to preserve
that levelness. Moreover, even when advantage is acknowledged, its
preservation seems necessary and thus is experienced too as neutrality. For
example, maintaining a degree of advantage over criminal defendants
unconsciously seems "fair," because our desire to feel safe in relation to them
renders advantage a felt necessity.
The conjunction of these four considerations reveals a deep connection
between legal symmetry and advantage. Because symmetry reinforces
existing systems of privilege, it is inherently attractive, though perhaps
unconsciously so, to those who occupy the uppermost position in those
systems. A threatened erosion of advantage, as embodied in the kinds of
doctrinal proposals we have set forth, elicits an almost visceral response in
favor of symmetry. Moreover, symmetry seems "fair," at least in part,
because it reflects the social experience of the advantaged. The fact that
advantage is often not apparent to those who enjoy it, masks the symbiotic
relationship between symmetry and the status quo.
These considerations expose calls for symmetry as "What about me?"
complaints, which must be reevaluated in light of the interests most often
served by them-the interests of the already-advantaged in society. The
doctrines we have proposed are designed to alter the existing balance of
23. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769,774-75 (2d Cir. 1980).
24. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 126 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 107
(Marshall, J., concurring in part) (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887))).
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power and privilege. The "What about me?" response, though at times quite
understandable in view of the difficulty we all experience in giving up
advantage, may finally amount to little more than a rejection of the
fundamental premise that justice demands the use of legal doctrines (along
with other means) in the effort to dismantle existing systems of privilege
and/or redress advantage. We ought not to let the superficial appeal of
symmetry obscure that fact, or eviscerate the redistributive potential of
asymmetrical legal rules.
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